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Until the late 1960s people commonly asserted that ‘British justice is the finest in the 
world’. Americans were content that they had improved on it and established the 
world’s only democracy. The constitution, law and legal system were continually 
compared with the French system, where the accused was ‘presumed guilty’ and 
tortured. This paper examines the history of this ‘world’s best’ rhetoric back to the 
pre-Magna Carta era.  
 
 
When I started in practice [1959], it was an almost universal article of faith that English law 
and legal institutions were without peer in the world, with very little to be usefully learned 
from others. (Lord Bingham)
1
 
 
In the early 1960s, people commonly asserted that ‘British justice is the finest in the 
world’, warning about other systems ‘In France, you’re guilty till proved innocent’. 
Working in the United States, I have heard the same mistake about the French and a 
conviction that ‘American justice is the best in the world’. Twentieth century 
Americans travelled the world, drafting constitutions for emergent democracies, like 
their British predecessors. It was taken for granted that they enjoyed the world’s only 
democracy.
2
 The hyperbole appears to have been attached to both substantive law and 
procedure, and rested on these concepts: the ancient origins of the common law, 
Magna Carta as a source of fundamental rights, habeas corpus, the rule of law, the 
system of precedent, jury trial, the absence of torture, the method of proof and rules of 
evidence, and the superiority of English judges. It was intertwined with ideas of 
constitutional superiority. English Parliamentary democracy was favoured over 
European absolute monarchy. Later, Americans were keen to emphasise their 
constitutional rights and democracy.
3
 
 The power of the rhetoric went further than boasting. Centuries-old comments 
and expressions of ideals about what the law should be were later taken to be 
statements of the law. Early writers were not careful to separate statements of law 
from rhetoric. Writers like the prolific and influential Coke simply invented ‘ancient 
maxims’ and ‘fundamental law’, yet his and other such works were and still are 
treated as books of authority.  
  
THE ANCIENT COMMON LAW 
 
The common law rightly boasts of being old, but it is not just English and some of it 
is not that ancient. Given modern hostility to the French legal system, ironically, the 
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roots of the common law are both Anglo-Saxon and Norman French.
4
 English law 
started out as Anglo-Norman, shared by the feudal society on both sides of the 
Channel. After 1066, the Franci and Anglici were amalgamated under a common law 
and spoke one language.
5
 By the time that Roman law was received around Europe, 
there was no chance that it would supplant centuries of English law. ‘The common 
law of England…is the oldest national law in Europe…the oldest body of law that 
was common to a whole kingdom’.6 
The use of rhetoric appealing to and romanticising ancient law is older than 
the common law. It started in the Anglo-Saxon literature. Many English-language 
royal declarations survive, from the time when England was a collection of tiny 
kingdoms. The charters were sometimes ‘rhetorical and fanciful’.7 Magna Carta 
followed a line of charters. Henry I’s coronation charter 1100 promised to confirm the 
law of Edward the Confessor, ‘establishing a mythological golden age of justice 
before 1066’.8 The first legal writing appeared in the Anglo-Norman literature of 
1113-18 (Henry I). In Laws of Edward the Confessor, the anti-Norman writer 
‘endeavoured to show the good old law which in his opinion ought to 
prevail…Unfortunately Coke and all the older historians took this book seriously, and 
so a good deal of legend came to pass into history’.9  
 
MAGNA CARTA 1215 
 
The Great Charter is the common law world’s most prolific source of romantic 
rhetoric and symbolism on ‘ancient’ rights, epitomised by Kipling’s poem, 
Runnymede.  A Google search retrieves two million references. This charter of 
promises was extracted from King John by the barons to secure their rights. It is 
treated as a universal declaration of rights but it did nothing for the non-propertied 
majority, who ‘were to remain without an active voice in government for another 700 
years’.10 It was immediately annulled. Jenks thought that ‘the great secret of the false 
glamour which invests Magna Carta’ was the misinterpretation of ‘freemen’ as ‘the 
man in the street’. He thought some clauses worked ‘cruel injustice’ on the 
dispossessed for centuries.
11
  
The best modern authority, Holt, was less cynical and argued that it was the 
longest living legal enactment. Thanks to its adaptability, ‘Magna Carta has been 
preserved not as a museum piece, but as part of the common law of England.’12  It 
was reissued in 1216, 1217 and 1225. The last became law. Magna Carta was the first 
document in the first Statute Book. Three and a half clauses of the 1297 version are 
still law. From 1216 to 1417, it was confirmed by all monarchs. More or, indeed, all 
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clauses are technically still law in the Antipodes.
13
 By 1300, Magna Carta’s 
‘international career’ was already launched ‘for anyone else seeking to share in 
English ‘liberties’’. Norman lawyers argued that it should apply there too and so the 
1300 Très Ancien Coutumier contains strikingly similar principles.
14
 Holt showed that 
in 1331-68, through a series of interpretive statutes, the meaning of clause 39 was 
already broadening. This is the British Library translation: 
 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or 
outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force 
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law 
of the land. 
 
‘Lawful judgment of peers’ was interpreted to require jury trial. ‘The law of 
the land’ was broadened to ‘due process of law’ and most astonishingly, ‘no free man’ 
was broadened to ‘no man’. From 1500, all Inns of Court students read collections of 
statutes which began with Magna Carta.
15
 It was in the turbulent seventeenth century 
that it became an ubiquitous source of revolutionary rhetoric and its meaning became 
more far-fetched. Over the centuries, lawyers routinely jumbled the wording of the 
different editions but by now, everyone assumed it to be part of fundamental law. 
Coke expanded ‘liberties’ to individual liberty, asserting that it outlawed monopolies. 
In the debate on the Petition of Right 1628 and elsewhere, lawyers wrongly asserted it 
as the source of habeas corpus. For radicals such as Hobbes and Locke, it switched 
meanings and turned into part of their concept of natural law and rights. Meanwhile, 
colonists in America similarly regarded it as their ‘birthright’, along with the Petition 
of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement 1701.
16
 
Settlement began in 1606 with the Virginia Charter. As this was partly drafted by 
Coke, unsurprisingly, James I granted that Englishmen would take with them their 
domestic constitutional rights. All of the colonial legislatures used the reinterpreted 
wording of Magna Carta. Books on rights were among the first seven printed in the 
colonies (including Care, cited below). In 1687, William Penn published an edition of 
Magna Carta. When the colonists objected that the Stamp Act constituted taxation 
without representation, they invoked Coke in claiming that it was ‘against Magna 
Carta and the natural rights of Englishmen’.17 Crucially for our story, after 
independence, the rhetoric of English rights and liberties was preserved within the 
embedded Bills of Rights. The 1789 constitution repeats various declarations of the 
rights of men. It declares itself the supreme ‘law of the land’, a phrase lifted from 
Magna Carta. The fifth and fourteenth amendment were based on clause 39. The first, 
second and eight amendment originated from the English Bill of Rights. Importantly, 
the ‘due process of law’ clauses were applied as a check on legislatures, which was 
never the intention in England.
18
 So Magna Carta does have more real and symbolic 
power in the United States than in the UK. The Runnymede memorial was erected by 
the American Bar Association in 1957. In the US, Magna Carta is still taken seriously 
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as an interpretative tool.  It was referred to or relied on as a direct or indirect source of 
principles by the US Supreme Court over 40 times in the last 43 years.
19
  
 In the UK, any claim to fundamental law needs qualifying. Thanks to the 
unwritten constitution and the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, like all other 
documents that claim to be constitutional foundations, Magna Carta only means what 
a contemporary UK Parliament deems it to mean. Lord Chancellor Irvine, giving the 
2002 inaugural Magna Carta lecture at the Australian House of Representatives was 
hard pressed to cite contemporary application in the UK. Typically, in the 2004 
‘Belmarsh case’ on indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects,20 Lord Bingham 
acknowledged the detainees’ argument that clause 39 was the original source of 
habeas corpus but he did not rely on it, later explaining that this was an unhistorical 
myth.
21
 The other eight judges did not mention it, though it was emblazoned on 
newspapers the following day. An advocate’s reliance on Magna Carta is more likely 
to be rejected by modern UK judges. Magna Carta’s indirect power, as a source of the 
rule of law,
22
 is, though, a tool of judicial review of executive action in the UK.  
              
   
MORE THIRTEENTH CENTURY MYTHOLOGY 
 
Bracton,
23
 who Coke declared ‘the flower and Crown of English jurisprudence’, 
demonstrated that the common law was separate and distinct from other legal 
systems
24
 but he carefully selected his cases to illustrate the law as he thought it ought 
to be. Henry Maine considered him something of a fraud, passing off Roman law as 
English. After 1350, he went out of fashion but enjoyed an influential revival from 
1569 when the printing press established him, like Glanvill, as a common law 
authority. Judicial citations of Bracton in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
settled some elements of English private law on Roman principles. He provided a 
useful tool for Coke. Another source for Coke, The Mirror of Justices (1290) ‘is 
certainly the most fantastic work in our legal literature…a puzzling mixture of sense 
and nonsense’ which ‘introduced a good deal of legend into our legal history’.25 It 
mixed Anglo-Saxon law with canon law and description with comment and jokes. It 
was printed in 1642 and was treated as ‘solemn history’, by Coke.    
 
FORTESCUE LAUNCHES THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE FRENCH 
(c. 1395 - c.1477) 
 
In Praise of the Laws of England (1468-71)
26
 was written when Fortescue, Chief 
Justice of the King’s Bench, was exiled in France, as a didactic dialogue between an 
imaginary ‘Chancellor’ and the exiled Prince Edward, in which the Chancellor 
extolled the virtues of English law and government. In this book, and The Governance 
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of England,
27
 ‘like many people who live abroad, he found it difficult to resist the 
tendency to idealise his own country’.28 He praised an English monarchy, supposedly 
limited by parliamentary assent. The prime duty of a king was to ensure justice 
according to law, therefore English ‘political and royal’ law was a better guarantee of 
justice than the ‘only royal’ kingship of France.29 England was ‘always really or 
potentially governed by the most excellent laws’.30 Fortescue’s ‘Chancellor’ appeared 
to be in denial of the absolute monarchy in England, despite his own exiled status.    
English law’s long survival was proof that it was the most just. Fortescue 
compared the French justice system, ‘a pathway to hell’, using ‘so many kinds of 
tortures…that the pen shrinks from putting them into writing’, plus an inadequate 
system of taking testimony, with an incorruptible English system, featuring the attaint 
jury.
31
 If an English jury were found to have made a false oath, they could have ‘all 
their possessions seized into the king’s hand, their houses and buildings demolished, 
their woods cut down…Now, is not this procedure for revealing the truth better and 
more effective?’32  
Fortescue was ‘the major English political theorist of the fifteenth century’.33 
Hazeltine
34
 considered him one of its most eminent lawyers. He was the first English 
jurist to perceive that English common law was materially different from Continental 
civil law. His rhetoric had a profound effect on institutional and legal systems and 
legal and political thought in Europe.  His emphasis on theory prompted Coke, Hale 
and Bacon to seek and explain the fundamental ideas of the common law. He was the 
first to deal with the constitution in a systematic manner. Chrimes considered him ‘the 
true founder of the English school of comparative law and comparative politics’.35 As 
a judge, Fortescue made a contribution to the common law, in case law. He was the 
first writer on the common law jury and the first to describe the legal profession.   
His importance in our story is that his fanciful eulogy was treated as authority. 
Lockwood said this was a mistake. Praise was a rhetorical, ‘critical and reforming’ 
work, ‘the author seeks to persuade the reader of the value of English law and 
government as it should be’.36  For example, the title of one chapter prescribed how 
jurors ‘ought to be’ chosen. Lockwood said the process of distorting his work began 
in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, I suggest that, given his effusive style, it is 
unsurprising that later readers misinterpreted him. 
 
COKE INVENTS ‘ANCIENT’ LAW (1552-1634) 
 
Coke’s works were highly influential on the common law in England, as ‘books of 
authority’ and are still regularly cited throughout the common law world. All the more 
alarming, then, that they are replete with rhetoric and that he made up much of the law 
as he went along. Coke’s Reports (1572-1616) were ‘an uncertain mingling of 
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genuine report, commentary, criticism, elementary instruction, and recondite legal 
history’.37 He prefaced each volume with a ‘to the reader’ section, typically: 
 
[T]he ancient and excellent laws of England are the birthright, and the most ancient and best 
inheritance that the subjects of this realm have, for by them he enjoyeth not only his 
inheritance and goods in peace and quietness, but his life and his most dear country in 
safety.
38
 
 
Coke’s Institutes (1628-1644), along with his other books, were ‘the first 
comprehensive statement of the common law since Bracton’.39 Coke never ventured 
outside the common law.
40
 It was self-evident to him that had any other system been 
superior, it would have supplanted English law, ‘If the ancient laws of this noble 
island had not excelled all others, it could not be but some of the several 
conquerors…would…have altered or changed the same’.41 
He had so mastered the mass of year books and was so deep in erudition that 
‘most people were inclined to take his word for almost any proposition’.42 
Consequently ‘The triumph of Coke’s view in many cases meant the triumph of 
doctrines which were already nearly obsolete in his own day’. He ‘eliminated foreign 
influences’ and helped establish ‘a supreme common law’, said Plucknett.  He made 
up ‘spurious Latin maxims, which he could manufacture to fit any occasion and 
provide with an air of authentic antiquity’.43 He ignored precedents that he did not 
want to follow. Instead, he would assert in an ‘outrageously unhistorical statement’ 
that ‘this is and always has been the common law’.44  
Coke’s works show no evidence of a coherently thought out constitutional 
position. 
45
 He praised ‘the High and Most Honourable Court of Parliament’ (Fourth 
Institutes), ‘tracing’ the mid-thirteenth century institution back to the ninth century.46 
His second Institutes venerated Magna Carta, which he saw as the foundation of 
English law. ‘Magna Charta was a living person to him’.47 It took on meanings it had 
never had before.  His approach suited the founding fathers of American common 
law. Jefferson and Adams cited him. A partial set of his Reports travelled over on The 
Mayflower. The new colonial courts sent for copies of his work and ‘until well into 
the nineteenth century Coke on Littleton was a book every lawyer knew’.48 Thorne 
concluded that the English and Americans could thank Coke for much ‘fundamental 
constitutional law not entirely supported by the authorities’.49 
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HALE (1609-76) 
 
Hale’s History of the Common Law, 1713, was the first comprehensive text of this 
nature.
50
 He praised the common law in a relatively calm manner. His third chapter is 
entitled Concerning the Common Law of England, its Use and Excellence, and the 
Reason of its Denomination, but he was simply comparing it with statute law. When 
things went wrong and ‘the right Order of Government’ was disturbed, the common 
law was there to restore it.
51
 In Chapter XI, he illustrated ‘the many preferences that 
the Laws of England have above others’52 but was, otherwise, restrained until Chapter 
XII, Touching Trial by Jury, which ‘seems to be the best Trial in the World’.53 Hale’s 
rhetoric has been remarked upon but he simply had an extravagant writing style. 
Hyperbole was reserved for jury trial. 
 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY PRO-JURY POLEMIC  
 
Lesser known commentators were not so enamoured of English law
54
 but were soon 
shouted down in the rhetoric of Coke. In 1651, Robinson petitioned Parliament for 
some reforms of ‘our own Lawes, which some…prefer before all the worlds, because 
they never well understood their own, much less those of other Countries’.55  They 
were a ‘nose of wax’. The customs of the Turks were preferable. He appended 
suggestions for more ‘speedy, cheap, and equall distribution of Justice’, including 
seven objections to jury trial. He was swiftly slapped down by Walwin: even William 
the Conqueror ‘unjust and unworthy…never attempted to take away Juries’. To do so 
would be ‘subversion of the fundamental Laws of the Nation’. Jurors had ‘served their 
country justly and faithfully…without fear or favour’. Such ‘English Liberties, 
contained in Magna Charta…’ were the means by which ‘an Englishman is to be 
known from a Frenchman amongst a thousand’.56  
 The superiority complex over the French had taken hold. Even more 
extravagant pro-jury rhetoric is to be found in 1680, in Hawles’ The Englishman’s 
Right a Dialogue between a Barrister and a Jury-Man.
57
 The juryman announced ‘I 
am summon’d to appear upon a Jury, and was just going to try if I could get off’. The 
barrister replied that jury trial was an ancient English liberty, confirmed by Magna 
Carta and ‘brought down to us as our undoubted Birth-right, and the best inheritance 
of every English man’, quoting Coke. ‘Observe the miserable condition of the poor 
people in most other Nations…subject to the despotick arbitrary lust of the  
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rulers…(subject to) Judges, most times mercenary, and creatures of Prerogative, 
sometimes malicious and oppressive, and often partial and corrupt…upon mere 
suspicions they are obnoxious to the tortures of the Rack…’58 
In 1682, Care published English Liberties, or the Free-Born Subject’s 
Inheritance. Turkey and France were attacked again. ‘The Constitution of our English 
Government [the best in the world] is no Arbitrary Tyranny, like the Turkish Grand 
Seignior’s; or the French King’s’. He repeated Fortescue’s arguments.59 
 
REVOLUTIONARY APPEALS TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW  
AND THE POWER OF JURIES 
 
The English and American revolutions were fuelled by appeals to fundamental law, 
rather than common law. Magna Carta, reinterpreted by Coke, came in especially 
handy. As Stimson remarked in The American Revolution in the Law, ‘It is 
notoriously common to summon the restorative myths of history, tradition, and ‘the 
good old law’’.60 She said the rhetoric did not reflect any coherent theory of politics 
and law. It was unclear what constituted fundamental law, what its origins were, 
whether Parliament was its originator, its equal or bound by it. Coke was its most 
frequently cited proponent in the colonies. By the eighteenth century, the French were 
copying American grand designs and words. Their Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen 1789 was drafted and promoted by Lafayette, inspired by the 
Declaration of Independence in a trip to America.
61
 
Appeals to a fundamental law were meaningless. The rule of law was meant to 
be a promise that the sovereign would rule by the law, not arbitrarily, but it was 
unenforceable. In exercising his prerogative, the king was largely his own judge.
62
 
Judges were not independent. They ‘did not regard themselves as arbiters between the 
Crown and the people, or (later) between Parliament and the people’.63 Judges, 
including Coke, were appointed and dismissed by monarchs for political reasons.  
 Gough said that nowadays, fundamental law has a precise, technical meaning 
in political science, referring, for instance, to the entrenched clauses of a written 
constitution. There was and is no such thing in the UK. Consequently, English writers 
such as Holdsworth were unsympathetic to the notion, whereas American writers 
welcomed seventeenth century references to fundamental law as forerunners of their 
own constitutional principles. Gough concluded that there had never been 
fundamental English law. What were really being referred to were fundamental 
principles of morality, of right and wrong. 
 Leveller John Lilburne made extravagant claims about jury-power, assuring 
the jurors in his first trial that they were judges of law as well as fact. Analysing those 
early trials, Stimson pointed out that they did not, as is popularly supposed, establish 
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English juries as judges of law, even in Bushell’s case.64 They were confined to fact-
finding in England. Their potential as law-finders was debated in America, with many 
seeing them as John Adams did, as ‘the voice of the people’. What this meant and 
who ‘the people’ were, in terms of jury eligibility, was the subject of several 
centuries’ debate.  
 While not challenging Stimson’s thesis, I would point out that in the ancient 
and modern pro-jury rhetoric, juries are defended precisely because they do have the 
effective power to nullify the law, as Americans call it, or apply their own equity, as 
the English call it. This amounts to the same thing. Juries take an oath to deliver a 
verdict according to the evidence but are morally valued because in practice, they do 
have freedom to acquit in the face of the evidence and the law. There was outrage at 
Auld LJ’s recommendation in the 2001 Criminal Courts Review that if the jury 
applied their own equity, their verdict might be overturned.
65
  
 
THE SHAKESPEAREAN POWER OF BLACKSTONE 
 
Blackstone, the first professor of English law, is central to our story. He bears most 
responsibility for modern ‘world’s best’ assertions. His 1765-69 Commentaries on the 
Laws of England were a collection of his Oxford lectures, explaining the whole 
common law in a simple, attractive style, much more digestible than Coke, ‘lost under 
sedimentary annotation’.66 His readability and attachment to fundamental law partly 
explain his longevity as a source of law in America, and the popularity of his rhetoric. 
It did not matter that ‘His history was not very profound’ and ‘His equipment in 
jurisprudence was also somewhat slender’.67  
Blackstone boasted that ‘our laws and liberties’ and constitution, ‘this noble 
pile’, were ‘the best birthright and noblest inheritance of mankind’.68 He emphasised 
the virtues of the common law, warning against legislation. He adopted Coke’s 
reverence of Magna Carta, and its mythological status. They both thought Clause 39 
established a right to jury trial (Devlin copying two centuries later). The jury was the 
‘palladium’ of English justice69 and ‘grand bulwark of liberty’.70 ‘…[W]e cannot but 
admire, how…impartially just the law of England approves itself…trial by jury ever 
has been, and ever will be, looked upon as the glory of English law’.71 It was ‘the best 
[forum]…for investigating the truth of facts, that ever was established in any 
country’.72 Blackstone reminded his audience how lucky they were, not to be 
suffering arbitrary judicial power exercised in ‘France or Turkey’.73  
It is difficult to find modern jury rhetoric which does not use Blackstone’s or 
Devlin’s assertions. Blackstone’s sentiments penetrated the English language in the 
same way as Shakespeare’s phrases, such as ‘it is better that ten guilty men go free 
than that one innocent should be convicted’.  This ratio has been variously expressed 
as 5:1, 20:1, 50:1 (Fortescue), 100:1 (Bentham) and 1000:1 but it is no coincidence 
                                                 
64
 Pp. 20-28. 
65
 Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (London), chs. 6, 11.  
66
 S.F.C. Milsom, ‘The Nature of Blackstone’s Achievement’, Selden Society lecture, (1981) 5. 
67
 Plucknett, 286.  
68
 Concluding words of Commentaries, 435-6.    
69
 Commentaries on the Laws of England A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769, Vol. IV 
(1979), 349. 
70
 Vol. IV, 342. 
71
 Commentaries, Vol. III, 365 and 379. 
72
 Vol. III, 385. 
73
 Vol. I, 349. 
10 
 
that we adopted Blackstone’s 10:1 ratio in popular language.74 Glendon said that 
Coke coined the idea that a man’s home is his castle but it is Blackstone’s and 
Locke’s language of absolute property rights that fuels modern American rights talk: 
the ‘illusion of absoluteness’.75 
Blackstone is incomparably more important in the development of American 
law than England, where he was influential for only a century.
76
 His reputation never 
recovered from attacks by Austin and Bentham, who, at 15, had attended Blackstone’s 
lectures.
77
 Blackstone’s rhetoric stuck in Bentham’s craw. Rhetoric was ‘the art of 
misdirecting the judgment by agitating and inflaming the passions’.78 Dinwiddy 
remarked, ‘There was something almost obsessive about his animosity…’79 Bentham 
never stopped writing his unfinished Comment on the Commentaries, published 
posthumously. He called Blackstone ‘the dupe of every prejudice, and the abettor of 
every abuse’. 80 He attacked the common law as much as Blackstone idolised it.81 
Twining said that Bentham was appalled by the contrast between Blackstone’s 
complacent glorification of the common law and the realities of practice.
82
 Blackstone 
deprecated the growth of statute law but Bentham campaigned for codification. He 
ridiculed Blackstone’s invocation of natural law. Austin too attacked the 
Commentaries as a ‘slavish and blundering copy’ of Hale, without ‘a single particle of 
original or discriminating thought…fitted to tickle the ear’ in a ‘rhetorical and 
prattling manner’. 83 Most English lawyers, if they have heard of Blackstone, may not 
know the century he inhabited, let alone what he wrote. 
 
MEANWHILE, THOUGHT AND RHETORIC IN COLONIAL  
AND INDEPENDENT AMERICA – AND DE TOCQUEVILLE 
 
Some early rural pioneers around 1800 despised the common law, in a patriotic 
loathing of anything British.
84
 Miller quoted Root: ‘The Common Law comes from a 
people grown old in the habits of vice’ and a New Hampshire judge, ‘It is our duty to 
do justice between the parties; not by any quirk out of Coke and Blackstone – books 
that I never read and never will’. ‘Feudalists’ law was inimical to modern 
democracy.
85
   
This hostility was pointless. The 1774 Declaration of Rights claimed the 
common law of England as the ‘birthright’ (Coke’s word) of the colonists.86 Rantoul, 
in 1836, uttered the last rant against the common law.
87
 The lawyers won. Within 
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forty years of their ‘chaotic condition’ around 1790, the emergent American legal 
profession secured ‘a position of political and intellectual domination’.88 Lawyers 
claimed credit for steering the revolution. ‘[T]he Constitution had been nurtured on 
the Common Law’.89 Langbein concluded that ‘American law came to be…a body of 
law so strongly patterned on the learned English law that we still…think of the 
English and American legal systems as comprising an inseparable entity called 
Anglo-American law’.90  
Blackstone was originally attacked for being enamoured with British forms of 
government. Inconveniently, however, Blackstone’s were often the only law books 
available. By 1775, more copies had been sold in America than England.
91
 His work 
went into far more editions and, whereas production peaked in 1770 in England, it 
peaked in 1890 in America. He replaced Coke as a more readable source
92
 and he 
organised his account according to categories of law, instead of the old writ system. 
He emphasised natural law. ‘English common law would apply in the new nation not 
because the king’s judges commanded it, but because the common law embodied 
enduring principles of natural justice. Blackstone gave the common law a seeming 
universality that allowed the Americans to retain it despite its English taint’.93 
Glendon said it would be hard to exaggerate the degree of esteem in which the 
Commentaries were held.
94
 John Adams was on the first list of subscribers. Jefferson 
prescribed Blackstone as essential to legal studies. Lincoln, when asked the best way 
to study law, advised that a student should read Blackstone and, when he had finished, 
should start all over again.
95
  
 Unsurprisingly, the statue of Blackstone in the Royal Courts of Justice, 
London, was donated by the American Bar Association.
96
 G. Wickersham unveiled it 
in 1924, with a highfalutin flourish of his own: 
 
So long as the principles of the Common Law endure as the basis of your jurisprudence and 
ours; so long as the great conceptions of civil liberty which were embodied in the Magna 
Carta, in the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights and the Habeas Corpus Act and which 
have been enshrined in the American Constitution continue fitly to express the fundamental 
principles of the common civilization of the men of English speech throughout the world, all 
men may have confidence that liberty will not perish from the earth, and that the highest type 
of civilization will be secure.
97
 
 
Blackstone’s Commentaries live on as a source of common law, legal and political 
thought and rhetoric in the United States. The Library of Congress has 143 versions. 
There are over 700 volumes of various editions in the Yale library. Blackstone was 
cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in no fewer than 20 cases in 30 months, recently, and 
in over 700 cases in total.
98
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When Blackstone was reaching his American peak, de Tocqueville 
commented as an outsider, on Democracy in America.
99
 He considered the 
‘aristocratic character’ of lawyers to be much more marked in England and America 
than elsewhere, because the system of precedent gave them a role as interpreters of 
the law
100
 and the courts controlled the democracy.
101
 Everyone was obliged to 
borrow the ideas and language of the law because ‘Scarcely any political question 
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question’.102 
De Tocqueville’s language has entered modern American rhetoric, notably 
‘The jury is, above all, a political institution’.103 Unlike the English jury of aristocrats, 
‘The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as direct and as 
extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage’.104 
Modern, educated Americans still refer to De Tocqueville and describe the jury as a 
political institution, democratically representing ‘the voice of the people’, words 
borrowed from Adams. They justify the jury as a control on judicial power but it goes 
deeper. In the 1990s, at Berkeley, I found that verbal questioning of the American 
jury system was often met with incredulity. I abandoned writing a critical analysis 
when an eminent sociologist remarked ‘I don’t know why you’re doing this. Don’t 
you realise the jury is as important to Americans as the Presidency?’ A mere 
challenge to the institution was seen by many not as mild eccentricity, as in England, 
but as heresy. 
 De Tocqueville did not heap unqualified praise on American democracy, 
however. Chauvinistic rhetoric got on his nerves: 
 
Nothing is more embarrassing…than this irritable patriotism of the Americans…a free country 
in which…you are not allowed to speak freely of private individuals or the state105…I know of 
no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion.
106
 
 
And in Volume II, ‘The Americans…unceasingly harass you to extort praise, 
and…fall to praising themselves…If I say to an American that the country he lives in 
is a fine one, ‘Ay,’ he replies, ‘there is not its equal in the world’…”107  
 
‘IN FRANCE, YOU’RE GUILTY TILL PROVED INNOCENT’ 
 
By the twentieth century, this was uttered in the same breath as English or American 
justice being ‘the finest in the world’. For instance, in England, in 2011, a non-lawyer 
asked me, ‘The presumption of innocence – it’s a quirk of English law isn’t it?’ In 
2002, a first-week postgraduate student asked if it were true. A poll of her class mates 
showed that one fifth shared her mistake. In Berkeley, my French-born LLM student 
                                                 
99
 1835; 1840, translated: H. Reeve; revised, F. Bowen, P. Bradley (eds.) (1945). 
100
 Vol. I, 287-8. 
101
 P. 289. 
102
 P. 290. 
103
 P. 293.  
104
 P. 297. 
105
 Vol I, 253. 
106
 P. 273 
107
 P. 236. ‘Such is not the case with the English.’ 
13 
 
avoided jury service by exaggerating her accent and asserting in court, ‘I am French.  
In France we believe people guilty until proved innocent’.108  
Hostility to the French system dates back to Fortescue. Furthermore, English 
lawyers condemned the use of torture,
109
 ‘the great European blunder’, as Langbein 
called it,
110
 as a method of proof. The difference arose thus: when the Fourth Lateren 
Council of 1215 abolished ordeals as a method of proof, a substitute had to be found. 
The English developed jury trial. Most of Europe adopted judicial torture to extract 
confessions.
111
 Continental use of torture, the absence of a formal plea, the use of 
judicial fact-finding and other differences in criminal procedure fuelled common 
lawyers’ hostility for centuries and have somehow been reinterpreted in Anglo-
American popular mythology into a French reverse burden of proof. Quintard-
Morenas explained one 1899 source of this idea, ‘The Dreyfus case, in which… 
Dreyfus…was falsely accused of high treason, crystallized in the common law world 
the widely shared belief that suspects in France were presumed guilty. The 
reporter…for The Times reminded his readers how fortunate they were to live in 
England’.  
In 1955, Glanville Williams tackled this misapprehension, in The Proof of 
Guilt.
112
  
 
In England every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. This 
proposition, dear to the hearts of Englishmen, is popularly supposed to epitomise the 
difference between English and French criminal law. Of course it is not true…there is 
a sense in which it would be correct to say that the presumption does not hold in 
either country.     
 
In the US, eminent comparative lawyers, Damaska, Ehrmann and Langbein, tried to 
correct the same mistake. It stemmed from the labelling of Continental systems as 
‘inquisitorial’, when being compared negatively with ‘accusatorial’, common law 
systems. Williams had warned against the imprecise use of these terms.
113
 Ehrmann 
considered the designations misleading, a product of cultural ethnocentricity.
114
 
Langbein said ‘Continental criminal procedure is thought to be unjust and oppressive. 
It is called ‘inquisitorial’…an epithet harkening back to the witchcraft trials…Among 
English speaking peoples the belief is widespread…that in Continental procedure the 
accused is presumed guilty…’115 Damaska thought that the terms were used 
indiscriminately. 
 
The dichotomy…purports to represent the distance between the old continental inquisitorial 
procedure at its historic worst, and a variable selection of somewhat idealized features of 
modern American criminal proceedings…the only alternative to some lofty conceptions of 
Due Process is a lapse into the horrors of a procedural system where charges are not specific, 
the accused is not accorded the benefit of the doubt, his confession is coerced, his detention 
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before trial is unlimited, he has no right to counsel, and is not advised of his constitutional 
rights.
116
       
 
There was a repetitive argument as to which model of criminal procedure was better 
at uncovering ‘the truth’, and/or fairer. Such views, concluded Damaska, must be 
examined with suspicion. This did not stop Langbein, in the context of civil
117
 or 
criminal procedure: ‘Adversary criminal trial depends on the deeply problematic 
assumption that combat promotes truth…truth will emerge even though the court 
takes no steps to seek it…The lawyer-dominated system of criminal trial that emerged 
in eighteenth-century England was not premised on a coherent theory of truth-
seeking…Truth was a by-product’.118  
In examining how this ‘truth deficit’ came to prevail, he pointed to English 
disdain of the European model ‘…as late as the eighteenth century, European criminal 
procedure exhibited defects that made it appear self-evidently unworthy of 
emulation’. This is best illustrated in the work of High Court judge, J. F. Stephen, 
below.  
Mutual hostility continues. The detention of British plane-spotters in Greece 
provoked months of press attacks on foreign procedure. A 2002 Times letter said 
‘Every other EU country has a different system of criminal justice from that which 
makes us the envy of those ‘less happier lands’’.119 There were critics of French delay 
in murder investigations.
120
 British media criticised the time taken to investigate the 
death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997. Criticism of Portuguese procedure was 
rampant after Madelaine McCann’s 2007 disappearance. 
Unsurprisingly, common law devices, imported into Continental systems, have 
not always been welcomed. In 2004, French lawyers demonstrated against the 
importation of Anglo-Saxon concepts such as the plea and plea-bargaining, in a 
procedure aimed at organised crime.
121
 
   
BRITANNIA RULES THE WAVES (1860-1960)
122
 
 
A Victorian assault on French criminal procedure came from Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen, in A History of the Criminal Law of England.
123
 73 pages document his trial 
observations. His 22-page criticism befitted an era of empire and triumphalism over 
the French.  
 
The accused is cross-examined [by the judge] with the utmost severity, and with 
continual rebukes, sarcasm, and exhortations, which no counsel in an English court 
would be permitted… [placing him] in a position essentially undignified and 
inconsistent with his other functions…he is in a position to give the jury the full 
benefit of his thoughts…[The enforcement of rules of evidence] gives to English 
trials that solid character which is their special characteristic. They seem to be quite 
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unknown in French procedure. Witnesses say what they please and must not be 
interrupted, and masses of irrelevant, and often malicious, hearsay which would never 
be admitted into an English court at all, are allowed to go before French juries… 
[English rules of evidence] seem to me to be just what is wanted to bring French trials 
into a satisfactory shape…French juries habitually take the law into their own 
hands…English practice is in every way superior to the French.124 
 
As for Victorian bombast on the common law, the English legal system and the 
constitution in general, Van Caenegem cited some flowery examples, including 
Pollock himself, who considered the common law to be divinely ordained.
125
 ‘Our 
Lady the common law’ was reasonable because it was English and the English were 
reasonable people. It encapsulated common sense, from an ‘immemorial antiquity’. 
126
 Europeans naturally considered their law to be a gift from God too. 
Dicey shaped the self-image from 1885. He lauded the ‘English’ constitution 
and empire, ‘The system of leaving the self-governing colonies alone…made it 
possible for the English inhabitants and… the foreign inhabitants, of the Dominions to 
recognise the benefits which the Empire confers’.127 The rule of law was ‘a special 
attribute of English institutions’, disregarding Aristotle’s writings.128 Written bills of 
rights were pointless. He attacked the French 1791 constitution. By contrast, the 
Habeas Corpus Acts ‘declare no principle and define no rights, but they are for 
practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual 
liberty’.129 As Bingham warned, though, ‘His foreign comparisons were shown to be 
misleading, and he grossly understated the problems which, when he wrote, faced a 
British citizen seeking redress from the government’.130 
Lord Chancellor Haldane ‘assumed without question that British justice was 
the best in the world and that the dominions and colonies would always be of the 
same opinion’.131 Bingham commented on this period’s ‘unquestioning belief in the 
superiority of the common law and its institutions…In so far as comparisons were 
drawn with what went on elsewhere, they were to England’s advantage.132  
Abel-Smith and Stevens pointed out that in the 1940s, ‘it became customary to 
refer to judges in hushed tones of awe. The Lord Mayor’s dinner set the tone…In 
Parliament too, the mere mention of the English judges led a whole symphony of 
cloying praise’.  They were seen as the guarantors of the world’s highest standards, 
the superlative ‘British justice’.133   
 This, then, was the level of superciliousness affecting the British, when they 
drafted the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. A.W.B. Simpson explained 
that lawyers’ thinking ‘was still dominated by Dicey’s simplistic and impoverished 
discussion of the domestic protection of rights’.134  Despite the fact that the British 
thought ‘bills of rights were evil simply because they were foreign’, governmental 
circles believed it was in Britain’s interests to take a prominent part in the human 
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rights movements in Europe and the UN because ‘The Foreign Office, as ever, had 
encountered some slight problems with foreigners, who tended to get things wrong’ 
and because of the ‘received truth’, that ‘Britain was the country which had invented 
effective protection of fundamental individual rights, or liberties, through the rule of 
law…England was ‘the land of the free’. The English had provided a model…and 
others would do well to follow them’.135  
The French Declaration and the US constitutional documents were merely 
‘derivative of English constitutional thought, and owed much to the works of John 
Locke and William Blackstone… [and in any event] Neither the USA, nor France, 
appeared…for much of their history, to take their supposed commitment to liberty 
particularly seriously’.136 The Convention’s adoption was handled by junior FO 
officials, some of whom had not heard of the phrase ‘human rights’.137 Naturally, the 
Convention was not seen as an instrument against which UK arrangements might be 
found wanting so it came as a shock when Greece took proceedings against the UK in 
1956.
138
 As for the UN, this was seen as a Foreign Office responsibility, with no 
domestic interest. British diplomats worked out their frustrated rage at negotiating 
with foreigners in their diaries.
139
 The Conservatives are still indignant that the 
Strasbourg court criticises the UK: ‘Europe’s War on British Justice’, as the Daily 
Mail calls it. 
140
 There is an ‘absurd notion that human rights are a creation of 
European federalism, foisted on the British’.141 
 
MISS HAMLYN TEACHES THE ENGLISH COMMON PEOPLE  
HOW LUCKY THEY ARE 
 
The well-travelled Edwardian, Emma Hamlyn (1860-1941) was an admirer of English 
law and institutions. She provided in her will for a trust for  
 
the furtherance by lectures…among the Common People of this country of the knowledge of 
the Comparative Jurisprudence and the Ethnology of the chief European Countries including 
our own…to the intent that the Common People of our Country may realise the privileges they 
enjoy in comparison with other European Peoples… 
 
English intellectual giants among the lecturers found themselves apologising to her 
ghost that their cynicism prevented their sharing her unbridled triumphalism.
142
 In 
1951, F.H. Lawson said he must criticise English law, ‘I am not living in a fool’s 
paradise’.143 Glanville Williams, in The Proof of Guilt, noting that the English 
considered their system ‘the best in the world’ criticised their criminal trial for the 
next 294 pages. Sir William Wade started his 1980 lecture ‘with an uneasy 
conscience’.  He could not bring himself to invite the common people to feel 
unqualified satisfaction in their constitution.
144
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 Polite foreigners lectured the English on how lucky they were. In 1964, 
Griswold rued the American loss of an experienced, permanent judiciary. ‘You are 
fortunate in the United Kingdom that you have been spared such excesses of 
democratic zeal.
145
 In 1950, O’Sullivan started The Inheritance of the Common Law 
with ‘The Common Law of England is one of the great civilising forces of the world’. 
From Magna Carta, a ‘sense of human equality passed into the texture of English 
thought and language’.146 The Scot, Lord Kilbrandon, in 1966, thanked the English 
for the rule of law: ‘world civilisation owes to England …a great debt of 
gratitude…’147 but apologised that some of his conclusions might favour other 
systems. Others lectured on the predominant influence of English law over theirs, 
such as South African Justice Schreiner, in 1967: The Contribution of English Law to 
South African Law; and the Rule of Law in South Africa.
148
 British justice had other 
admirers, including Chief Justice Burger, who said he always considered it ‘the best 
in the world’.149 
 Only the exceptional English lecturers, like Denning, praised elements of 
English law and the constitution.
150
 Goodhart, in 1952, sounded like Dicey:  
 
England has been a nation founded upon law for a longer period than any other State in the 
history of the world…Law and freedom are here so closely bound together that we cannot 
think of one without the other…English polity has for centuries been regarded as a model for 
all those who seek liberty throughout the world.
151
 
 
In 1956, Lord Devlin was effusive on the virtues of Trial by Jury, this ‘little 
parliament…the lamp that shows that freedom lives’152 Devlin’s propaganda was 
outstandingly successful. There is barely a mention of the jury in England and Wales 
that does not quote his words. Elsewhere, he claimed that all ex-colonies had kept the 
common law as the greatest safeguard of their freedoms.
153
 By 1974, however, 
Scarman, like Wade, was typical of later lecturers, providing a more measured 
evaluation:  
 
The common law has been…one of our most successful exports… (but), despite its worldwide 
expansion, it learnt surprisingly little from other legal systems. Paradoxically, now that its 
days of expansion are over, it is more open to foreign influence and challenge than when it 
strode the world as part of the British colossus.
154
 
 
VOX POP   
 
By the late 1960s, faith in British justice was wavering, as it was in all European and 
some American institutions. The complacency of previous centuries had had a 
fossilising effect on elements of English law. ‘It was a proud boast of Lord Bathurst 
the 18
th
 century Lord Chancellor, that when he left office, he had left English law 
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exactly as he had found it.’155 By the 1960s, little had changed in the English legal 
system since the Judicature Acts 1873-75. In the new crisis of confidence, the English 
abolished the death penalty when they realised they had hanged innocent people. 
Cynicism was manifest in law schools by 1970. Baby boomers were taught just how 
flimsy ‘civil liberties’ were. Griffith’s Politics of the Judiciary156 portrayed judges as 
‘parasitic’ conservatives who did not ‘stand out as protectors of liberty, of the rights 
of man, of the unprivileged’.157 The BBC and Ludovic Kennedy produced 
programmes like Rough Justice, about wrongful convictions. The Royal Commission 
on Criminal Procedure 1981 brought statutory protection for the accused in the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 but confidence reached its nadir in 1991, after 
exposés of cases such as the Birmingham Six prompted the establishment of the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. Criminal procedure is now under constant 
review and change, following Auld’s Criminal Courts Review 2001. The civil justice 
system, scandalised by Dickens, has been overhauled, after the Civil Justice Review 
1988, the Woolf Report 1996
158
 and the Jackson Review 2009-10.
159
 Tribunals were 
restructured from 2010. 
Since the 1980s, people are more likely to assert that they used to think that 
British justice was the finest in the world: 
 Cambridge Professor John Spencer, in 1987, ‘If British justice is really the 
best in the world it ought to be able to correct [mistakes]’.160 
 Hugh Callaghan, of the Birmingham Six, in 1989, ‘My father was in the 
British Army…He always used to tell me British justice was the best in the 
world. What would he say if he could see me now?’161 
 P. Ashman, on the litany of wrongful ‘IRA’ convictions, ‘the image of British 
justice as “the best in the world” has been badly tarnished’.162 
 Iris Bentley, in 1990, on the campaign to exonerate Derek, wrongfully hanged, 
‘My father taught us British justice was the best in the world’.163 
 Retired Judge, James Pickles, in 1991, on the unsuccessful first appeal of the 
Birmingham Six, ‘People in this country believe that British justice is the best 
in the world, but they don’t know any other system’.164 
 N. Lezard, in 1999, reviewing Geoffrey Robertson’s The Justice Game, ‘a 
necessary corrective to the idea that British justice is the best in the world’.165 
 Darsham Chohar, on the failure to investigate the death of his son, in 2000, ‘I 
was brought up in India believing that British justice was the best in the 
world’.166 
                                                 
155
 Carnwath L.J., ‘The Art of the Possible’, Counsel, February 2002, 20. 
156
 (1977), penultimate page. 
157
 Abel Smith and Stephens, 1967, above, catalogue attacks on judges from about 1956: ch. XI.  
158
 Access to Justice – Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the civil justice system in England and 
Wales (Department for Constitutional Affairs). D. Gladwell remarked ‘Perhaps we’d become rather 
complacent. British justice was the best in the world’, (1999) 149 N.L.J. 90. 
159
 Judiciary website. 
160
 The Times, 28 April. 
161
 H. Mills, ‘The Birmingham Six’, The Independent, 5 December. 
162
 ‘Miscarriages of Justice’ (1989) 149 N.L.J. 8.  
163
 R. Shrimsley, ‘Family’s plea to clear man hanged for murder’ The Daily Telegraph, 21 July. 
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 Lotfi Raissi, British pilot accused of knowingly training the ‘9/11’hijackers, in 
2002, ‘It was a shock for me…I believed British justice was the best in the 
world…’167 
 B. Reade, in 2001, on the £3,500 compensation paid to parents of fans killed 
in the Hillsborough football disaster, ‘can we please pass a law allowing us to 
smack anyone who says that British justice is the best in the world?’168 
 John Batt, in 2001, solicitor of the wrongfully convicted Sally Clark, ‘We 
have the best legal system in the world if you are guilty but it doesn’t do you a 
hell of a lot of good if you are innocent’.169 
 Tom McNamara, father of Alan, victim of a wrongful conviction, in 2002, ‘If 
you’d have told me three years ago that this sort of thing could have happened 
now I would have just laughed…we’re supposed to have the best justice 
system in the world…’170  
 Keir Starmer Q.C., in 2006, on the McLibel case, ‘We pride ourselves on 
having the best legal system in the world but…’171 
 Imran Khan and Michael Mansfield Q.C., in 2006, ‘It is often said that the 
Legal Aid system is the envy of the world …however…’172 
 Ann Widdecombe in 2009, ‘There was a time, when British justice was the 
envy of the world, when innocent until proved guilty meant just that’.173 
 Richard Ingrams in 2010, ‘Like many of my generation, I was brought up to 
believe that British justice was the finest in the world…That was before we 
discovered that, thanks to incompetence and corruption, innocent men and 
women had been sent to prison and sometimes even hanged’.174 
 
A 1993 Solicitors Journal survey showed that only 21 per cent of people agreed that 
British justice was the best in the world.
175
 Lord Taylor LCJ said he would like people 
to feel that it was.
176
 Such was the drop in confidence in the criminal process that, 
from 2001, the Government aimed to bolster it.
177
 Hazel Genn’s 1999 book, Paths to 
Justice showed a similar lack of confidence in the civil courts. 
Nowadays, it is difficult to find a non-lawyer asserting that British justice is 
the best in the world.
178
 Barristers claim to be the world’s greatest advocates179 and 
the Judges Council, in 2003, claimed our judiciary were ‘admired round the world’ 
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and ‘entirely free of corruption’, which Stevens considered a ‘degree of hubris’ that 
bore ‘some of the hallmarks of 1960s complacency’.180 Smulian, examining why 
London was losing international arbitration business, cited litigators who blamed the 
cultural arrogance of English and US lawyers and English judges, who were 
convinced that their legal systems and methods were innately superior.
181
 
Exposés of the defects of the US justice system were sometimes still met with 
‘the best in the world’ rhetoric. The 1991 beating of black motorist Rodney King by 
Los Angeles police officers was broadcast in 83 countries. Their acquittal provoked 
riots. Attorney General William Barr nevertheless assured Americans that ‘Our 
criminal justice system...is the fairest known to man’182 and in the early hours of 
Independence Day 1993, Fred Graham, manager of Court TV, seemingly oblivious of 
international scorn and derision, said his daily broadcasting of the trial had enabled 
the world to see how fair the trial was and how well justice was done in ‘the greatest 
justice system in the world’.183 Public opinion clung to this hyperbole.  A 1999 ABA 
survey showed 80 per cent of respondents agreed that the American justice system 
was the best in the world.
184
 Confidence may have diminished by now, though. The 
2015 annual Harvard Institute of Politics survey showed that 49 per cent of young 
Americans distrusted the justice system.
185
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Why does all of this matter? A boasting nation comes to believe itself, as the 
story above has shown. We have only been developing the capacity for self-criticism 
since the late 1960s. It barely needs mentioning that slavery flourished in both lands 
of the free. US segregation served as a model for South African apartheid. Friedman 
described the Victorian ‘extreme and blatant hypocrisy’ in America, in divorce law, 
‘the whole of the criminal law’ and civil law. ‘Convenient ideologies and myths’ 
buttressed arrangements.
186
 In England, there ‘was a huge hypocrisy, which in some 
ways Locke personified - that the property rights were peculiar to white men’.187 
Criminal procedure was shocking. Until 1984, suspects had no statutory pre-trial 
protection. Bingham said that well after 1950, some judges still summed up to the jury 
in favour of a conviction. Civil procedure was a pre-Dickensian game exploited by 
lawyers, resulting in 63 critiques before Lord Woolf’s 1998 reforms. Recent ‘legal 
origins’ theories that the common law promotes healthy capital markets have been 
countered by historians drawing attention to the severe handicap the (corrupt) English 
legal system posed to the commercial world in the industrial revolution.
188
  Brunel 
and others resorted to arbitration. As for human rights, Simpson attacked the ‘myth’ 
that the courts protected liberties. ‘The British judicial tradition of always backing the 
authorities has only in relatively recent times been weakened’.189 But this colonial 
habit continues. When elderly Kenyans sued the UK in 2010-11 for torture in 1953, 
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the High Court was told there were no files, until one persistent civil servant found 
them hidden, prompting The Times leader to comment on ‘This country’s culture of 
secrecy…and mendacious cover-ups [contriving to hide] 2000 boxes…relating to 37 
former British administrations…the end of Empire was bloody, protracted and 
involved abuses…’190 
The rhetoric becomes empty and is used for attacking other systems. Lord 
Bingham cited academics who suggested that the phrase ‘rule of law’ had degenerated 
to a meaningless, Anglo-American self-congratulatory device, cited, for instance, by 
both sides in Bush v Gore, the challenge to the validity of the 2000 presidential 
election.
191
  
Complacent democracies cannot see their degree of hypocrisy. The UK only 
dismantled the problematic role of Lord Chancellor and took the top court out of 
Parliament in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, after the Council of Europe sent a 
rapporteur into the UK Parliament to complain that it was embarrassing trying to 
teach emergent European democracies about the separation of powers in the face of 
the UK setup. ‘Every day…I am in confrontation with the new democracies from 
central and Eastern Europe…and they say “What about the British?”’192  
Having boasted for centuries of its rule against torture, the UK Government 
had to compensate 12 Guantanamo detainees who alleged British complicity in 
American torture.
193
 Both countries indefinitely detained terror suspects without trial, 
in a ‘monstrous failure of justice’, as Lord Steyn called it.194 The British readily 
tortured foreign combatants abroad in the twentieth century and UK citizens in the 
Northern Irish ‘troubles’, not to mention recent detainees like Baha Mousa in Iraq, in 
2003. Critical lawyers have condemned a ‘Retreat from due process’195 and from the 
rule of law
196
 in both countries.  
There is a dangerous resurrection of the superiority complex.
197
 The 
Conservatives and UKIP attack EU and European Human Rights law.
198
 We would do 
well to remind ourselves of Karl Llewellyn: ‘Nowhere more than in law do you need 
armor against that type of…snobbery – the smugness of your own tribe in your own 
time: We are the Greeks, all others are barbarians’.199  
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